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RESTITUTION OF ILLEGAL RENT:
RE KASPRZYCKI AND ABEL;
RE SYMONS AND ALEXANDER
Jack Fleming*
I. THE ISSUE
In two recent Ontario cases' before District Court Judges sitting as local
Judges of the Supreme Court, restitution of rent paid under void notices of
rent increases was ordered. In both cases rent had been paid according to
written notices of rent increase which had been served less than the re-
quired statutory ninety days prior to the time of increase. As the land-
lords in each case were obliging enough to serve notices (rather than omit
them entirely) and the tenants fortunate enough to retain their copies
over the years, the facts were not disputed and the clear legal issue was
before the judges. This note will review these two cases and the issue of
restitution of legal rent payments generally.
In Re Symons and Alexander, four notices of rent increase had been served
over as man years. The first two notices failed to give ninety days no-
tice, but the last two notices were proper apart from the amounts (being
based on the amounts illegally set by the void notices). Restitution of$2,205.00 was ordered and the legal rent for the apartment was declared
to be $416.86 per month rather than the $460.00 per month claimed by
the landlord.
In Re Kasprzycki and Abel, the tenant had been given seven notices of
rent increases over the years, all giving less than ninety days notice(most around one month, some around two months). Both parties stated
in their affidavits that they were unaware of the ninety day notice re-
quirement. Some of the increases were also in excess of the statutorally
alowed percentage2 or too soon after a previous increase.3
* Jack Fleming is a lawyer at Halton Hills Community Legal Clinic in George-
town, Ontario. He was counsel for the applicants (tenants) in the Symons and
Kasprzycki cases. Copyright © 1986 Jack Fleming.
1 Re Symons and Alexander (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 395 (L.J.S.C.); Re Kasprzycki
and Abel (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 536 (L.J.S.C.).
2 Residential Tenancies Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 452, s. 125.
3 Residential Tenancies Act, R.S.O. 1980, c 452, s. 124.
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His Honour Judge Carnwath held that Mr. Kasprzycki was entitled to
the return of $4,55.00 in excess rent paid and declared that the legal
rent for the unit was $200.00 per month (the rent payable prior to the
void notices) rather than the $345.00 per month being charged.
Both the Landlord and Tenant Act and the Residential Tenancies Act
contain a requirement of ninety days notice of rent increase but neither
Act provides a remedy for lack of proper notice, apart from authority for
the refusal of a tenant to pay an increase pursuant to a void notice.
JURISDICTION
The Residential Tenancies Act does provide a remedy for rent increases
which are in excess of the statutory percentage allowed or where an in-
crease takes place within twelve months after a previous increase.4 The
Residential Tenancy Commission had held that it has no jurisdiction to
provide any remedy in cases of lack of proper notice5
In determining overpayments under Section 129 the Residential Tenancy
Commission will not take into account the fact that notices of increase
were void and generally will simply calculate the maximum increases
which could have been taken under the legislation to determine the
amount of overpayment.'
4 Residential Tenancies Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 452, s. 129(2). This section only deals
with rent increases in violation of Part XI of the Act. Section 60, containing the
notice requirements, is found in Part V. The Residential Tenancy Commission
also has a monetary jurisdictional limit of $3,000.00, but s. 84(4) of the Act pro-
vides that proceedings may be taken in a court of competent jurisdiction when
the amount claimed exceeds $3,000.00. Thus, it is only cases of improper notice
which lack a remedy. However, this lack of remedy is less clear in the light of the
decision of the Ontario Court ofAppeal in Rae v. Rank City Wall (4 September
1985), 1172/84 (Ont. C.A.), where it was held that "the validity of a notice given
pursuant to s. 60 of the Act is, indeed, a matter or a question arising under the
Act." This decision does not go so far as to hold that a remedy may be granted
under s. 129, but (as now reflected in the R.T.C. Interpretation Guidelines) if a
matter is otherwise properly before the R.T.C., the effect of invalid notices may
be considered. Exactly what effect this will have on R.T.C. decisions is unclear,
but given the practice of "deeming" proper increases (see footnote 6), it is unlike-
ly to have any effect.
5 Re 30 Springhurst Ave. (1981), 2 R.T.C. 64 (Residential Tenancy Commission).
6 An exception to this general rule is where evidence of actual increases paid is
available, as s. 125 of the Residential Tenancies Act provides that increases can-
not be more than 4% of "the last rent that was charged for an equivalent rental
period". Thus, if an increase was not charged, it will not be deemed. But if it was
charged excessively, or too frequently, or without proper notice, it will be deemed
to the appropriate amount (as if maximum increases had been properly taken):
ReLightfoot and VI-GO Holdings Ltd. (1983), 2 T.L.L.R. 129 (Residential Tenancy
Commission); Re Philpott and Anderson (1985), Ottawa 4206/85 (Ont. Dist. Ct.);
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It should be noted that in cases where the increases were made without
proper notice and also violated Part XI of the Residential Tenancies Act,
it may be preferable to bring a restitution action in court rather than an
application to the Commission (in which the increase will be deemed at
the maximum allowable amount). The difference in the amount recover-
able may be significant.
An initial issue in bringing such an application before the court is that of
the court's jurisdiction over illegal rent cases. The Commission is given
exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters and questions arising under this
Act".7  The short answer is that this is not a matter or question arising
under the Act as the Act provides no remedy in these cases. As well,
the Divisional Court has confirmed that judges may consider the legal
rent payable for a rental unit when it is necessary for a matter otherwise
property before them.8
However, when the illegality of rent increases arises not only from lack
of proper notice, but also due to breach of the provisions of Part XI of the
Residential Tenancies Act, then it would appear that the Commission
does have jurisdiction to hear the case.9 This is not, however, an exclu-
sive jurisdiction. 0
11. EFFECT OF THE NOTICES
The first point to be considered in these cases is the effect of the notices
of rent increase. In some cases no written notice will have been given at
Re Anderson and Philpott (3 June 1985), (Resid. Tenancy Comm. Appeal Panel)
[unreported]. But for an opposite decision see Re Sovie and Toronto Apt. Build-
ings (1985), 6 R.T.C. 51 (R.T.C. Appeal Panel), where a rent not charged was
deemed. Quaere whether "charged" means demanded by the landlord or actu-
ally paid by the tenant. Presumably if a landlord gives less than 90 days notice
and the tenant refuses to pay, the rent was not "charged". See also the comment
on Rae v. Rank City Wall in note 4.
7 Residential Tenancies Act, R.S.O. 1980. c. 452, s. 84(1).
8 Re 364579 Ontario Ltd. and Murray (1983), 44 O.R. (2d) 100 (Div. Ct.). Note
that this is without prejudice to any later determination of the lawful rent by the
R.T.C.. If the court declares the lawful rent on the basis of void notices and the
landlord subsequently applies to the R.T.C. and gets a declaration of the rent
based on deemed increases, what is the net result? Presumably, the decision of
the R.T.C. would take precedence, but this would not affect the judgement ob-
tained by the tenant for restitution of illegally paid rent: it would only affect the
subsequent legal rent payable. It should also be noted that the only way that a
landlord could bring such a matter before the Commission would be to serve no-
tice of a rent increase in excess of the allowable percentasge and apply for whole
building review: Residential Tenancies Act, s. 126(1).
9 Rae v. Rank City Wall, supra, note 4 at 3.
10 Ibid , at 4.
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all by a landlord, but in both Symons and Kasprzycki written notice
was given, the only defect being that less than ninety days notice was
given.
The Symons case was argued by the landlord's counsel entirely on the ba-
sis that the notices were not valid but were effective ninety days after
service. The tenant's right to return of the money if the notices were void
was not disputed.
Section 129 of the Landlord and Tenant Act sets out the notice require-
ments:
"129(1) a landlord shall not increase the rent for residen-
tial premises unless he serves on the tenant a notice in writ-
ing setting out his intention to increase the rent and the
amount of the increase intended to be made not less than
ninety days prior to the end of,
(a) the period of the tenancy; or,
(b) the term of a tenancy for a fixed period.
(4) Subject to the provisions of the Residential Tenancies
Act, an increase in rent by the landlord where the landlord
has not served a notice according to the provisions of subsec-
tion (1) is void."
Section 60 of the Residential Tenancies Act is similar:
"60(1) A landlord shall not increase the rent for a rental
unit unless he gives the tenant a notice in the prescribed
form settingout his intention to increase the rent and the
amount of he increase, expressed both in dollars and as a
percentage of the current rent, intended to be made not less
than ninety days before the end of,
(a) a period of the tenancy; or
(b) the term of a tenancy for a fixed period.
(2) An increase in rent by the landlord where the landlord
has not given the notice required by subsection (1) is void."
Both Acts are framed in mandatory language: "a landlord shall not in-
crease the rent" without proper notice, and both provide that an increase
without proper notice is void. The wording is quite clear.
Both Acts provide for deemed acceptance of a notice of rent increase
when a tenant served with such a notice does not then give notice of ter-
mination to the landlord." This only has application when the tenants
11 Landlord and Tenant Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 232, s. 129(2); Residential Tenancies
Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 452, s. 61(1); Re Cando Property Management and Wilson(1983), 44 O.R. (2d) 123 (Div. Ct.). Note that 90 days notice was given in that case.
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have been served with proper notice of rent increases: there cannot be
deemed acceptance of a void notice.12
There is an important substantive reason for the notices being void if not
properly served ninety days prior to an increase. The ninety days notice
gives the tenant one month within which to give the sixty days notice of
termination 3 should the tenant decide to move rather than pay the in-
crease.
Section 121 of the Residential Tenancies Act does state that substantial
compliance with forms is sufficient, but this section deals only with the
content of forms, not with the required notice period.
In summary on this point, the language of the statutes is clear and man-
datory; the legislation allows for correction of other defects, but not for
lack of proper notice; the Divisional Court has, in other contexts, made
it clear that mandatory notice requirements in the Landlord and Tenant
Act are to be strictly interpreted; and short notice deprives a tenant of
the right to terminate a tenancy prior to an increase.
These arguments succeeded in both Symons and Kasprzycki. In Kaspr-
zycki it was held that there had never been a legal increase as all of
the notices were void. In Symons, two of the four notices were void and
the subsequent two were valid for a proper percentage increase over the
legal rent as recalculated on the basis of the first two notices being void,
rather than for the amounts set out in the notices.14 The next question be-
came whether the illegal rent paid could be recovered.
III. RESTITUTION OF ILLEGAL RENT
Restitution is based on the concept that monies paid by mistake may &en-
erally be recovered as they are not "voluntary' and it would be against
conscience and equity to retain them. Obviously, a tenant who pays an
illegal rent knowing it to be illegal will be making a voluntary payment
12 Cando Property Management, supra, note 11 at 127, is authority for the
proposition that a void notice of increase cannot be deemed effective an appro-
priate length of time later (in that case, the notice was 12 months early). See also
on this point Re Burton-Lesbury Holdings and Holt (1984), 27 A.C.W.S. (2d) (Co.
Ct.), where the tenant gave one month's notice of termination, left two months
later and argued (unsuccessfully) that the notice was effective sixty days after
being served - similar to the landlord's argument in Symons. See also the many
cases indicating that the notice requirements of the Landlord and Tenant Act
generally are interpreted strictly by the courts: Bianchi v. Aguanno (1983), 42
D.L.R. (2d) 76 (Div. Ct.); Re Devitt and Sawchyn (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 652 (Div. Ct.).
13 Landlord and Tenant Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 232, s. 101; Re Devitt, supra,
note 12.
14 Landlord and Tenant Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 232, s. 129(2)(b); Residential Tenan-
cies Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 452, s. 61(1)(b).
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(unless compulsion can be shown) and will not be able to recover.
ACQUIESENCE
It might be argued that a tenant who has paid in ignorance may nonethe-
less be barred as having aquiesed to the notice. There are two responses
to this. First, both the statutes under consideration prevent a tenant from
contracting out of his or her rights under the legislation." Secondly, no
acquiesence could be deemed on the part of a tenant who is not acting on
full knowledge of the facts.16 Similarly, the defence of laches is una-
vailable where the tenant did not have full knowledge of his or her
rights, even if the tenant had the means of easily obtaining this infor-
mation. 7
MISTAKE OF FACT
It has been held that money may only be recovered when paid under a
mistake of fact, not a mistake of law (with certain exceptions).1 8 The
Supreme Court of Canada has recently limited the exceptions to cases of
compulsion and illegal transactions.19
In Symons it was held that payment of rent pursuant to void notices of
increase was a mistake of fact. This was based upon the Supreme Court
of Canada case of George (Porky) Jacobs Enterprises v. City of Regina. 1o
In that case, the plaintiff promoted wrestling exhibitions and was re-
quired to pay a licence fee for the privilege, pursuant to a municipal by-
law. Had the bylaw been correctly interpreted, Mr. Jacobs would have
been required to pay an annual fee. Labouring under a common mistake, a
daily fee was demanded and paid for four years. This was held to be a
mistake of fact, as the parties believed that a law existed which did
15 Landlord and Tenant Act, s. 82; Residential Tenancies Act, s. 2; Kay v. Park-
way Forest Developments (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 329 (Div. Ct.).
16 J.S. Williams, Limitation of Actions in Canada, 2d ed., (Toronto: Butter-
worths, 1980) at 34-37: "Aquiesence and ratification must be founded on a full
knowledge of the facts..." (at 37). La Banque Jacques-Cartier v. La Banque
d'Epargne de la Cite' et du Dist. de Montreal (1887), 13 App. Cas. 111 at 118
(J.C.P.C.).
17 Kelly v. Solari (1841), 9 M & W 54, 152 E.R. 24; Lindsay Petroleum v. Hurd,
[18741 L.R. 5 P.C. 221; George (Porky) Jacobs Enterprises v. City of Regina (1964),
44 D.L.R. (2d) 179 (S.C.C.).
18 Kelly v. Solari, ibid.
19 Hydro Electric Commission of Nepean v. Ontario Hydro (1982), 132 D.L.R.
(3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
20 Supra, note 17.
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not. In Symons, the parties were unaware of the existence of a law and
this was held to be a mistake of fact. This argument did not succeed in
Kasprzycki.
COMPULSION
One exception to the usual bar to recovery in mistake of law cases is
where compulsion can be demonstrated. It is not necessary that no other
recourse be available; practical compulsion is sufficient. 2
A case of practical compulsion in the payment of rent was found in Re
Statton and Zalan and Tessenyi. 22 In that case the notice of rent in-
crease given did not meet the requirements of Section 60 of the Residen-
tial Tenancies Act. The County Court Judge found that practical compul-
sion existed as:
(1) The tenants did not wish to incur the expense of moving;
(2) One of the tenants had undergone quadruple bypass heart
surgery after moving in and the stress of-moving again could be
dangerous;
(3) They did not wish to interrupt the schooling of a child
living with them prior to completion of Grade 6.
Restitution was ordered, citing the Eadie v. Township of Brantford case.
Arguably, compulsion always exists in these cases, given that the alter-
native is for the tenants to move. Certainly, with the current extremely
tight.housing market in Ontario, a good case could be made for compul-
sion in any case of notice of rent increase.
IN PARI DELICTO
In the Kasprzycki case, restitution was ordered on the basis that the
parties were not in pari delicto (equally at fault). The leading case on
this point is Kiriri Cotton v. Dewans. ' In that case there was an illegal
key deposit paid for the privilege of renting a rent controlled apartment
in-Uganda. It was a clear mistake of law: both parties had lawyers, but
they misinterpreted the relevant legislation; both thought it legal to do
what they did.
21 Eadie v. Township of Brantford (1976), 63 D.L.R. (2d) 561, where under a mu-
tual mistake of law, a severance fee was demanded and paid (under a bylaw
which was subsequently found to have been illegally passed) to enable the plain-
tiff to develop his land; Canadian Mortgage Association v. City of Regina [1917] 1
W.W.R. 1130 (Alta. S.C.), where taxes were paid to avoid the land being sold for
taxes.
22 (1983), 1 T.L.L.R. 267 at 277-278 (Co. Ct.).
23 [19601 A.C. 192 (P.C.).
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In Kiriri, as in Kasprzycki, the legislation made no direct provision for
recovery of the illegal payment, therefore the case fell to be decided on
the basis of general restitution law. The judgement of the Privy Council
was deliver& by Lord Denning, who stated the issue as being "are they
in pari delicto ?"?4  It was argued that because the parties were equally
mistaken, they were in pari delicto. That proposition was answered as
follows:
"Thus, if as between the two of them the duty of observing
the law is placed on the shoulders of the one rather than the
other - it being imposed on him specially for the protection of
the other - then they are not in pari delicto and the money
can be recovered back."25
Thus, the case stands for the proposition that where the illegality of
the payments arises from a statute designed to protect a class of people of
whom the plaintiff is a member, then the parties are not in part delicto ;
and where they are not in pari delicto recovery may be had for a mis-
take of law.' Many cases have established that the Landlord and Ten-
ant Act is remedial legislation enacted for the protection of tenants
NEPEAN HYDRO
The leading statement of the Supreme Court of Canada on restitution is
found in Hydro Electric CommiSsion of Township of Nepean v. Ontario
Hydro. ' In the dissenting judgement of Dickson J. (as he then was) con-
curred in by Laskin C.J.C., the distinction between mistakes of fact and
law was criticised:
"when we ask what is the distinction between "law" and
"fact" no exact answer is discoverable in the law reports."29
24 Ibid. at 203.
25 Ibid. at 204
26 See also Re Ontario Securities Commission and British Canadian Options
(1979), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 208 (O.H.C.); Sidmay Ltd. v. Wehttam Investments [1967] 1
O.R. 208 (C.A.), [1968] S.C.R. 828; Browning v. Morris (1778), 2 Cowp. 791,98 E.R.
1364; Haug and Nellermoe v. Murdoch (1916), 26 D.L.R. 200 (Sask. S.C.).
27 Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979 [19811 1 S.C.R. 717 at 718; Re Baker and
Hayward (1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 695 (C.A.); Re Bruns and Fancher (1977), 16 O.R.
(2d) 781 (Div. Ct.). On the Residential Tenancies Act, see In the Matter of 326
Bethune Street (1980), 1 R.T.C. 7 at 8: "... the public policy inherent in rent review
legislation supersedes the intent of the parties themselves."
28 (1982), 132 D.L.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
29 Ibid. at 201.
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The now Chief Justice discussed the condemnation of the distinction by
many legal writers and jurists, and cast doubt upon the "ill conceived" or-
igins of the concept.30
Dickson J. went on to detail various exceptions to mistake of law which
developed to circumvent the absurdities of the distinction. The Kiriri
principle was described as follows:
"A further judicial development to circumvent the rule barring
recovery under mistake of law is what might be termed the
Kiriri principle (Kiriri Cotton Co. Ltd. v. Dewani, [19601 A.C.
192). Hasicafly it allows a party to benefit from a "protective
statute" and to recover money paid under a mistake of law,
where the "law" in question is a statute whose purpose is to
protect his interests. This is surely a common sense proposi-
tion. It is impossible to know all the law, presumptions and
maxims to the contrary notwithstanding. To deprive a citizen
of the benefit of a statute designed precisely for -his protection
solely because he is unaware of its existence is an absurdity".31
Having reviewed the absurdity of the law/fact distinction and having
put his stamp of approval on the Kiriri exception, Dickson concluded by
writing:
"I should prefer to reach this result by putting mistakes of
law and mistakes of fact on the same footing rather than by
increasing the number of exceptions engrafted on the rule and
which have already, to a great extent, emasculated the
rule... The true doctrine must surely be that enunciated by
Lord Mansfield C.J. in Bize v. Dickason, Supra : "[Wihere
money is paid under a mistake, which there was no ground to
claim in conscience, the party may recover it back.'".
Estey J., writing the majority judgement (Martland and Lamer J.J. concur-
ring), dealt with this attempt to abolish the fact/law distinction sum-
ma'ily by merely stating that the appellant's submission did not argue it
and tat his "considerations have been confined to the operation of the
doctrine of mistake of law as argued."
In Mr. Justice Estey's review of the law of restitution, he held that it was
settled law that money paid under a mistake of law could not be recov-
ered while money paid under a mistake of fact could be, until the Kiriri
Cotton case significantly varied the accepted rule? 4
30 Ibid. at 201ff.
31 Ibid. at 209.
32 Ibid. at 211. On reform of the law, see also G.H.L Fridman and J.G. McLeod,
Restitution, (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) at 166ff.
33 Ibid. at 243.
34 Ibid. at 226.
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Estey J. considered the facts in the Nepean case as they related to the
Kiriri principle and found that the plaintiff had not brought itself
within those principles. But he did not stop there.
Mr. Justice Estey then reviewed the caselaw cited for the proposition de-
veloped in Kiriii and concluded that these earlier cases did not support
the general proposition in Kiriri, thus deciding that the fact that the
parties were not in pari delicto does not, by itself, constitute an exception
to the bar against recovery in mistake of law cases.
Estey J. then concluded by finding that recovery can be had for mutual
mistake of law only where there is compulsion or an illegal transaction
and that in "the case of illegal transactions, the concept of in pari delic-
to is introduced to determine entitlement to recovery"6 On the facts of
that case, where charges not authorized by the statute were billed and
paid, for the supply of power, Mr. Justice Estey held that there was no
illegal agreement, merely money paid under a mutual mistake of law.
Thus, while dismissing the proposition that the parties not being in pari
delicto constitutes an exception to mistake of law cases, Estey J. did ac-
cept that this is a relevant consideration where there is an illegal con-
tract and he did accept Kiriri as as an illegal contract case.3 7 The law
regarding the recovery of money paid under illegal transactions where
the parties are not in pari delicto was stated to apply only to those situ-
ations where the transactions are "contrary to public policy or prohibit-
ed by statute".' In Nepean Hydro, neither party offended any prohibi-
tion in law.
KASPRZYCKI AND ABEL
In Kasprzycki, the Nepean Hydro case was reviewed by Carnwath
D.C.J., who expressed sympathy for the position of Mr. Justice Dickson
that the fact/law distinction should be abolished. He went on to note
that Estey J. found:
"... that the principle of in pari delicto as enunciated by the
Privy Council in the Kiriri case was neither the law of Eng-
land nor in Ontario and disposed of the Nepean case on other
grounds., 9
His Honour Judge Carnwath decided the Kasprzycki case by holding
that the tenant and the landlord were parties to an illegal contract, and
not in pari delicto in accordance with the "class protecting statute" prin-
35 Ibid. at 238.
36 Ibid. at 242.
37 Ibid. at 229.
38 Ibid. at 239.
39 Kasprzycki, supra, note I at 542.
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ciple in Kiriri. The payments in Nepean Hydro were merely not au-
thorized by the Act. Those in Kasprzycki were specifically prohibited
by the legislation and therefore constituted an illegal transaction as de-
fined by Estey J.41
IV LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
Bill 511 , currently before the Ontario Legislature*, is intended to total-
ly re-vamp Ontario's rent review system. It's effect on the type of situa-
tion raised in the Kasprzycki and Symons cases is not entirely clear, but
this note will offer some analysis and suggestions.
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Section 5 of the Bill is analogous to section 60 of the Residential Tenan-
cies Act.
"5. (1) The rent charged for a rental unit shall not be in-
creased unless the landlord gives the tenant a [90 days] notice
in the prescribed form...
(2) An increase in rent by the landlord where the landlord
has not given the notice required by subsection (1) is void."
There is a section providin& that actual notice of documents is sufficient,
but only if there is notice within the proper time.Y A tenant receiving no
written notice, or less than ninety days notice, would be entitled to reuse
to pay a requested increase. The increase would be delayed until proper
notice was given and the ninety days from that notice expired.
40 Ibid. The concepts of an "illegal contract" existing where statutory prohibi-
tions are violated, the restitution of money paid under an "illegal contract" when
the parties are not in pari delicto, and the finding that they are not in pari delicto
in "class protecting statute" cases are found in a number of other cases: Re On-
tario Securities Commission, supra, note 26; Browning v. Morris, supra, note 26;
Haug and Nellermore, supra, note 26; North Saskatchewan Seeds v. Couch
(1960), 31 W.W.R. 253 (Sask. Dist. Ct.).
41 Kasprzycki, supra, note 1 at 542.
42 Bill 51, An Act to Provide for the Regulation of Rents Charged for Rental
Units in Residential Complexes, 2d Sess., 33d Leg. Ont., 1986.
* Subsequent to the writing of this article, Bill 51 (the Residential Rent Regula-
tion Act, 1986 ) was passed by the Ontario Legislature, and proclaimed, in De-
cember of 1986.
43 Bill 51, s. 21(4).
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WHERE ILLEGAL INCREASE PAID
What of the tenant who unwittingly pays a requested increase without
proper notice? Section 95(1) provides as follows.
"95(1) No tenant is liable to pay any rent increase in excess of
that permitted to be charged under this Act."
The wording "this Act" rather than "this Part" means that improper no-
tice cases are not necessarily excluded from the remedy found in section
95. Section 95(2) provides that where a tenant applies and the Minister
finds that a "landlord has charged an amount of rent that is in excess of
that permitted by this Act", the Minister shall declare the maximum
rent which may be charged and shall order repayment of any excess rent
paid."
The key question is what is meant by the phrase "in excess of that per-
mitted by this Act". Is this intended to refer to "maximum rent" (which
is defined in section 1 as the lawful maximum rent which could have
been charged had all permissible increases been taken), or is an increase
without proper notice (a "void" increase) not one which is "permitted by
the Act"? In short, is it intended to deem all permissible increases or
not? If the latter interpretation is the correct one, then a tenant who has
paid an illegal increase would have a remedy under section 95.' If in-
creases are not deemed, then an increase taken without proper notice
would be in excess of increases "permitted by the Act".
The calculation of the excess rent paid would not be the same as in the
Kasprzycki and Symons cases, as section 71(4) provides that the annual
increase46 may exceed the statutory increase47 as long as the amount of
the new rent does not exceed the "maximum rent" (see definition above).
Thus, where a void notice is followed by a valid notice the following
year, the second notice would not be valid only for a statutory percentage
increase of the 'legal rent' (i.e. the rent prior to the void notice); it would
be valid for its full amount up to the "maximum rent".
If, on the other hand, "permitted by this Act" is intended to be equival-
ent to the concept of "maximum rent", then there is no remedy in section
95 for recovery of excess rent paid due to void increases. In that case, it
might be argued that an ordinary restitution action may be undertaken,
on the grounds that this falls outside of the exclusive jurisdiction given
44 Subject to a $3,000.00 limit (s.13(4)), but a tenant may apply to court for
amounts over $3,000.00 (s.13(5)).
45 An exclusive remedy, as s.13 gives the Minister and the Board exclusive juris-
diction over "all matters and questions arising under this Act".
46 The rent cannot be increased sooner than 12 months after the last increase:
s.70.
47 A percentage set each year - 5.2% for 1987. A landlord who feels that a higher
increase is justified must apply to the Minister of Housing.
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to the Minister as it is not a 'matter or question' arising under the Act as
no remedy is provided in the Act. The argument is similar to that suc-
cessfully made regarding the Residential Tenancies Act. As in the earli-
er Act, it is clearly stated that an increase is void, but no remedy is con-
tained within the Act.
The interpretation including section 5 cases within the remedy of section
95 is probably the correct one. Had the drafters intended to invoke the
concept of "maximum rent", a defined term, they could easily have done
SO.
PAST ILLEGAL INCREASES
What then of the tenant who has paid illegal increases prior to the pas-
sage of Bill 51? What law governs those cases?
First, it should be noted that the actual date in question is not the proc-
lamation date, but rather August 1st, 1985. The Bill regulates
(retroactively) increases from that date on, thus any increases from Au-
gust 1st, 1985 are governed by the discussion in the previous section.
If illegal rent payments prior to August 1st, 1985 are covered by Bill 51, a
tenant will find that his or her right of recovery may be severely limit-
ed. Section 95(3) limits an order for repayment of illegal rent payments
prior to that date to the excess paid over the amount that could have
been charged had "all increases permitted under" The Residential Pre-
mises Rent Review Act, 1975 48 and the Residential Tenancies Act been
taken. This would deem legal increases which were not taken and essen-
tially nullify recovery in these cases.
If that is not enough, section 66(1) provides that where a landlord files
the statement required under section 67 (for the new rent registry) within
the permitted time, no repayment of excess rent will be ordered under
section 95(2) for pre August 1985 overpayments.
Clearly, it is in the interests of tenants that these situations not be cov-
ered by Bill 51, and such appears to be the case.
Section 95(2) of Bill 51 provides for repayment of rent paid in excess of
that permitted by that Act or Part XF of the Residential Tenancies Act.
Thus, the same cases that were covered by section 129 of the R.T.A. are
covered by section 95(2) of Bill 51; the Bill claims no repayment jurisdic-
tion over R.T.A. section 60 cases, only over Part XI cases.
LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT
One further jurisdictional argument should be mentioned; one which ap-
plies to all void increases, both pre and post Bill 51. Section 129(4) of
the Landlord and Tenant Act provides that "[slubject to the provisions of
48 S.O. 1975 (2d session), c.12, predecessor to the Residential Tenancies Act.
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the Residential Tenancies Act an increase in rent [without the required
notice] is void."49 Could this be relied on in a restitution action with no
reference at all to rent review legislation?
Both Acts have sections declaring their primacy over other Acts. Pre-
sumably that in Bill 51 will take precedence, as it will be the more re-
cent piece of legislation.51 Is section 129(4) of the L.T.A. a provision
which conflicts with a provision of Bill 51? It does not conflict with sec-
tion 5 of Bill 51. It does not conflict directly with any provision of Bill
51. Restitution granted pursuant to the voiding of an increase by section
129(4) would conflict with the scheme set up by sections 95 and 71(4) but
that is a result of the operation of the equitable remedy of restitution
upon section 129(4) rather than a matter of a provision of a statute being
in conflict. Overlapping provisions which are not inconsistent need not
be construed to avoidduplication 2
This note only raises the question without delving into it, but it may be a
large escape hatch for tenants from the strictures of Bill 51 in recovery of
illegal rent payments.
V. IMPACT OF DECISIONS
The decisions in the Kasprzycki and Symons cases should have an im-
pact beyond their immediate facts. Certainly, they should make more
landlords aware of their obligations regarding notices of rent increase. If
restitution had not been allowed in these cases, landlords would be in the
situation of suffering no penalty for lack of proper notice, unless the ten-
ant caught the landlord at the beginning and refused to pay. The cases
also have implications for purchasers of rental buildings. A claim of res-
titution would be against the landlord who had actually received the il-
legal rent, but a declaration as to the current legal rent has an impact on
the current value of a property (pending any Subsequent decision by the
Residential Tenancy Commission). Also, a new landlord could inherit an
illegal rent situation and accept illegal payments unwittingly for some
time. A new landlord could be in for some surprises, as couldus or her so-
licitor if this danger is not investigated, or at least pointed out, when a
building is purchased.
Finally, these cases are examples of the role of legal clinics in develop-
ing test case litigation. The impact of the cases will probably go beyond
49 Being subject to the R.T.A. provisions only affects increases taking effect at
the start of a new tenancy, for which notice is not required. In any event, upon
proclamation of Bill 51 the R.T.A. is repealed: Bill 51, s. 126 and 127.
50 Landlord and Tenant Act, s.82(1); Bill 51, s.2.
51 E.A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2d. ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983)
at 235.
52 Ibid. at 236.
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assisting some individual clients to, hopefully, influencing the future be-
havior of landlords, to the benefit of many tenants. As well, now that
the point has been tested in court, many of the individual cases which do
arise may be handled by the private bar.
